repeated motto states, in bringing knowledge "from the bench to the bedside"), in order for patients to benefit from scientific progress.
However, at least in psychiatry (and arguably in most medical specialties), one is forced to admit that the translational concept has not yet lived up to this promise. Examples in which neuroscience has actually suggested new treatment approaches (such as deep brain stimulation for depression, 8 or pharmacological augmentation of exposure-based therapy for anxiety disorders 9 ) are few and at an experimental stage, and most new treatments are still developed on the basis of existing therapeutic strategies -which, in turn, were derived from chance and empirical pharmacology, rather than by an understanding of the neurobiology of mental illness. We still lack good pathophysiological models for most psychiatric syndromes, at both the molecular and systemic level. And diagnostic categories in the 5th edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) 10 basically follow the same structure as former ones, developed decades ago, much to the disappointment of those who expected to see neuroscience play a bigger role in psychiatric nosology.
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Of course, it could be just a matter of time before translation from basic neuroscience starts yielding its fruits in psychiatry. But after two decades of translational research causing more headlines than changes in psychiatric practice, perhaps it should be time to ask ourselves whether we are aiming our translational efforts in the right direction.
No one with a background in literary theory would dare to say that translation is a trivial matter. It is a science as much as an art, and seminal translations have been as important as original literary material in many cultural scenes. It is also hard work: a recent translation of the first third of Joyce's Finnegans Wake has recently come out in China after 8 years of labor by its author. Is there a downside in this convergence of languages?
Perhaps. If on the one hand it has facilitated approximation between psychiatry and neuroscience, it also has the potential to impoverish our capability of describing things.
Different fields of study use different languages for good reasons: studying the brain/mind at different levels of complexity (e.g., molecular, cellular, systemic, mental), each with its own set of methods (e.g., biochemical studies, imaging techniques, patient reports), will necessarily require different paradigms, classifications, and definitions; no single language or set of concepts will be efficient or useful at every one of these levels.
Nevertheless, in these times of translational frenzy, it is not uncommon for researchers to inadvertently assume that concepts used to describe one level of research should naturally be applicable to other levels as well.
This holds particularly true for DSM-V categories, a set of symptom-based constructs which have been "reified"
(i.e., turned into natural entities) to the point that many unconsciously hold it as a given that they should correlate to specific molecular, cellular, or imaging alterations in patients, or even in animal models. ) for the mapping between these levels to be potentially very frail, and thus a clear possibility that genetic or molecular markers might be an oxymoron for many (or most) psychiatric disorders. 
There are many steps from bench to bedside
The main point in understanding the difficulties involved in translational research is that there are many levels at which the brain (or mind) can be studied, and that each of them should be approached with its own particularities. We can describe phenomena at molecular, cellular, network, systemic, behavioral, or clinical levels, and none of them is a better descriptor of reality than the others -the reductionist idea that replacing symptoms with genes will lead to more solid knowledge is misguided, in the same way that understanding transistors and wires will not make someone a better software programmer. 
